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MEASURING SAFETY CULTURE IN A NON-US AIRLINE USING
THE COMMERCIAL AVIATION SAFETY SURVEY
Terry L. von Thaden
Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, Illinois, USA
Sólveig Ragnarsdóttir
Department of Human Factors, Cranfield University
Cranfield, Bedfordshire, United Kingdom

The purpose of this present study was twofold: firstly to test the psychometric appropriateness of the Commercial
Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) for flight operations developed at the University of Illinois, in non-US environment,
and secondly to assess the current state of organizational safety culture at a European airline. To achieve these
objectives the CASS was administered in a web-based format to the flight operations department at a major
European air carrier. The respondents reflected a representative employee distribution and a response rate of 31
percent. The internal consistency of the CASS indicated adequate reliability (all scores above 0.70). The survey
revealed a generally positive safety culture that was broadly speaking, average, with the perception that management
tended to lean toward delegating safety responsibilities to others in some areas and leaned toward collaborative
safety efforts in other areas. The safety culture at this airline appears to be strongest in the areas of Middle
Management (e.g. operations personnel) and weakest in the area of Organizational Commitment (e.g. going beyond
compliance). Findings also show significant negative correlations between employees at the airline fifteen years or
less and their perceptions of the airline’s safety culture. We compared these results to that of a US based airline. It is
evident that this survey is capable of distinguishing between different safety cultures whether in America or Europe.
Methodological considerations and improvements to the survey are also discussed.
Introduction

complete, valid measure of safety culture is also
needed to advance theory and research (Gibbons et.
al., 2006).

Highly advanced technological systems, such as
those in modern commercial aviation, are vulnerable
to the effects of poor organizational safety culture
(Reason, 1998). Surveys and questionnaires have
been widely used to assess safety in variety of
complex and high risk indiustries but few
comprehensive measures of safety culture have been
developed for the commercial aviation industry. A
comprehensive safety culture survey is the first step
in allowing airlines to take a proactive approach to
safety culture, rather than the reactive approach that
results from accident analysis (Gibbons, von Thaden
& Wiegmann, 2006). An airline might use a survey to
obtain a broad overview of safety culture needs, then
target any identified problem areas with more indepth, qualitative investigations. In this way, the
most urgent problems can be addressed first. Airlines
can survey their employees routinely to evaluate the
efficacy of safety programs previously implemented,
or as an instrument to provide decision support in
times of significant organizational change. For
example, two airlines undergoing a merger could
greatly benefit from understanding the safety culture
of each organization before the merger. This would
allow management to make informed decisions about
future
policies
or
anticipate
potential
incompatibilities between the two organizations. A

The purpose of this present study was twofold: firstly
to test the psychometric appropriateness of the
Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) for
flight operations in non-US culture, and secondly to
assess the current state of organizational safety
culture at a European airline.
Method
Apparatus/materials
In recent years the Commercial Aviation Safety
Survey (CASS) has been developed and validated at
the University of Illinois (Wiegmann et al., 2002 and
2003; Gibbons, et al., 2004). This survey is used to
measure current state, strengths and weaknesses of
organizational safety culture in aviation operations.
The CASS is a 55 item survey that was developed to
assess four global components or dimensions of
safety culture within the commercial aviation
industry. These components, depicted in Figure 1,
are: Formal Safety System, Informal Safety System,
Operational
Personnel,
and
Organizational
Commitment. Under every component there are three
subscales consisting of 4 to 5 items each.
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Figure 1 – The Safety Culture Model (from Gibbons, von Thaden and Wiegmann, 2004).
The survey questions are rated on a 7-point Likert
response scale, ranging from 1 strongly disagree to 7
strongly agree, with 4 representing neither agree nor
disagree. Space for respondents to write comments
were provided after each section and a General
Comments section was included at the end of the
questionnaire. Ten additional items assess the pilots’
perception of risk and safety behavior at their airline,
with items asking about the likelihood of an accident
or incident occurring at the airline. Further, two
additional questions regarding safety in ground
handling were in this administration of the survey. A
brief demographic section included at the end of the
survey provides additional information about the
respondents. Participants may indicate their position
(pilot or management), tenure with the company,
tenure in their present position, the appropriate age
bracket, type of aircraft flown for the company, and
whether they have reported a safety problem at their
present airline.

respondents could answer the survey electronically
preferably within next two weeks. . Participants were
provided a secure URL to log into the CASS. A
reminder was sent after two weeks, four weeks. The
international language in aviation is English and
therefore the survey was administrated in English and
the respondents answered the survey in English.
Participants
The response rate to the survey was approximately 31
percent. Thirty-eight respondents (45.8%) described
their primary job responsibility as Commander,
another forty (48.2%) respondents as Co-Pilot and
five as Supervisor/Manger or Other. To prevent
identification of individual pilots based on age or job
tenure data, participants were asked to indicate the
appropriate age or tenure bracket among a group of
ranges supplied, rather than an exact figure. The
majority (67.5%) of the respondents were between 31
and 50 years of age. Fifty-five percent of respondents
have been employed by the airline between one and
ten years.

Procedure
A large commercial air carrier agreed to participate in
this survey. A draft version of the CASS was shared
among the top administration to give the managers an
opportunity for input into the vernacular specific to
their airline. The background information was
tailored slightly to match the air carrier’s definitions
of management and personnel within their
organization. The survey was administrated online
through a survey website hosted at the University of
Illinois. The survey was administrated to 240 pilots
and 20 supervisors/managers through an email. The
email including two cover letters was sent to airline
employees; one from the researchers explaining the
purpose of this research and another from the
Director of Flight Operations encouraging employees
to participate. Participants were assured of their
anonymity. Participation was voluntary and no
remuneration was given to participants. The email
also had the hyperlink to a website were the

Results
The internal consistency alpha coefficients were
moderately high indicating adequate reliability for
each of the four safety culture dimensions, see Table
1. The lowest value is 0.71 for Informal Safety
System while the highest alpha value is 0.90 on the
Organizational Commitment scale. The reliability
coefficient as measured by Cronbach’s alpha for the
four dimensional instrument is 0.87, which is
acceptable.
The overall reliability for the 12 subscales is 0.90
which is satisfactory. The correlations between
subscales are not too high (highest 0.66) indicating
that the subscales are measuring different constructs.
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Table 1 - Reliability of Safety Culture Dimensions.
Dimensions (Abbriviation) #of items Alpha
Formal Safety System (FSS)

14

0.84

Informal Safety System (ISS)

14

0.71

Operational Personnel (OP)

13

0.73

Organizational Commitment (OC)

14

0.90

Overall reliability

55

0.87

Comparatively, Gibbons et. al. (2004) performed a
previous validation study at a US airline using their
original 5-factor model which was subsequently
updated to reflect the current 4-factor model
construct. The reliability coefficients for the two
studies are not directly comparable since the items
behind each subscale are not in all cases the same, yet
each shows suitable acceptable reliability.

of the values placed on worker safety and protocols.
This grid configuration allows an organization to
strategically map its position, and understand the
principles behind its mission in relation to its safety
culture. The outcome may be that an organization is
satisfied with its placement on the safety culture grid,
as it exists, and may wish to retain the status quo. An
organization can also begin to move toward a safety
culture that reflects the best fit for the purposes of the
type of work and workers in the organization, by
shifting the focus of the underlying cultural factors
towards the type of culture it would most like to
represent.

In the current study, there is a significant negative
correlation (p<0.05) between younger employees that
have been at the airline for fifteen years or less and
their perceptions of the airline’s safety culture.
However, this perception was not significant in
consideration of all respondents. There is also a
negative correlation between how many years the
respondent has spent at the current job within the
company and the perception of safety culture. This is
also significant (p<0.05) for employees that have
been in their current job for ten years or less. The
reason behind this is worth exploring with the aim of
mitigating the apparent declining attitude found
among the pilots, especially, in the middle age group.
This is an interesting finding worthy of future
research.
Figure 2 – The Safety Culture Grid
The Safety Culture Grid
To facilitate the comparison and interpretation of
different aviation safety cultures, a safety culture grid
(see Figure 2) is used to summarize the strengths and
weaknesses at a given organization. Blake and
Mouton (1964) originally developed a grid to assess
the managerial style from which principles were
adopted to approximate safety culture on a
multidimensional continuum or grid.

Five ranges were identified on which to plot safety
culture perceptions. These ranges represent a fusion
of strategic management science and organizational
behavior principles (Brodwin & Bourgeois, 1984;
Thompson & Strickland, 1993) and are described in
Table 2. Five general types of organizations have
been described by plotting management’s and pilot’s
perceptions of safety culture in a grid. The
description of each type can be seen in great detail in
Wiegmann et al (2003).

Safety culture may be best represented outside the
realm of linear configuration, rather within a
continuum of related variables, factored in concert
with managerial and employee perceptions revealing
the true characteristics of the organizational safety
culture. The grid approach allows an organization to
assess its own safety culture in relationship to its own
mission and values, and according to the type of
work performed. The safety culture grid is indicative

The Safety Culture Grid shown in Figure 3
summarizes the safety culture information as
characteristics of the study airline. The figure reveals
an organization with a positive Collaborative safety
culture that tends toward Middle of the Road. The
pilots valuate the safety culture a little higher than the
management. Hence, all the dimensions lie beneath
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This tendency is, however, not statistically significant
(p>0.05) for all the safety culture dimensions. It is
evident looking at the figure that management must
especially target issues regarding Organizational
Commitment but also Formal Safety System and
Informal Safety System, if they are to improve or
enhance their collaborative approach to safety. It
appears the pilots feel they have more of the
responsibility but not the authority or feel confident
they can change things. Overall, it is not bad but it
could be better. According to the analysis on the
Organizational Commitment dimension there is
suggestion that the commitment to safety, equipment
and technology could be improved at the airline.

Table 2 – Organizational Features in Safety Culture
Dimensions
Organizational
Key Factors
Type

Collaborative

Master Plan

DelegateSafety-to-Others

Provisional/
Avoiding

Middle-of-theRoad

*High assertiveness and high
cooperation,
*Employees responsible to evaluate
their own performance,
*Employee/management established
goals,
*Recognizes and encourages
personal responsibility for safety,
*Esprit de corps,
*Always seeking to improve and
*Looking for ways to develop a winwin situation.
*High managerial assertiveness,
*Means of ensuring safety
performance, by-the-numbers,
*Conservative decision-making,
*Operates by detailed
procedures/instructions/measures,
*Work carried out according to
procedure or policy and
*Safety-by-the-Rules.
*High employee assertiveness,
*Employees entrusted with setting
safety standards,
*Employees have pride in company
safety record,
*Staff specialists utilized,
*Works well with highly skilled,
educated, and experienced
employees,
*Based on personal experience and
*Laissez faire management.
*Avoidance: low assertiveness, low
cooperation,
*Do-it-yourself,
*Ad-hoc,
*Unplanned and
*Vague.
*Compromising a moderate
assertiveness and cooperation and
*Accommodating: low assertiveness,
high cooperation.

Figure 3 – Safety Culture Grid for the CASS
dimensions in a non-US airline.
Safety culture at an US-airline is shown on Figure 4
for comparison (Wiegmann et al, 2003). The model
used is the original five-factor model and therefore
the safety culture dimensions are different to the
four-factor model used in this study, but
representative of the dimensions nonetheless. The
Safety Culture Grid demonstrates an organization
that values a collaborative, team environment. All
dimensions lie above the blue line except for the red
circle which is Reward Systems. In this case the
dimension is almost on the blue line. The fact that the
dimensions are above the blue line indicates a
tendency towards Master Plan with higher
managerial than employee assertiveness. In this case
it appears that management should especially target
issues regarding Reward Systems if they are to
improve or enhance their collaborative approach to
safety. The two airlines have different safety cultures.

the blue line. There is a weak tendency towards
Delegate-Safety-to-Others (Organizational Commitment).
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This is evident by comparing Figures 3 and 4. The
airline in this study has a tendency towards DelegateSafety-to-Others but the airline for comparison
towards Master Plan. Both are tending towards
Collaborative even though the study airline can be
characterized as tending toward Middle of the Road.

7

(1,7) - Master Plan

Collaborative - (7,7)

PERCEPTION OF MANAGEMENT

6

5

Middle of the Road - (4,4)
4

Organizational Commitment
Management Involvment
Reward System
Employee Emploment
Reporting System
Total Safety Culture Score

3

Figure 5 – Safety Culture Grid for the CASS
subscales in the non-US airline.

2

Delegate-Safety-to-Others - (7,1)

(1,1) - Provisional/Avoiding
1

1

2

3

4

5

6

Between pilots and management on the subscale
Safety Fundamentals there is almost a significant
difference F(1,82) = 3.65, p=0.06. Management must
target issues regarding Going Beyond Compliance,
Safety Fundamentals and Dispatch. It would also be
wise to improve response and feedback between
management and pilots, safety values and
professionalism. Again this indicates that the safety
culture is clustering around the middle with tendency
towards Collaborative (Operational Personnel) and
Delegate-Safety-to-Others (Organizational Commitment). There is room for much improvement in
various areas as said before.
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PERCEPTION OF PILOT

Figure 4 – Safety Culture Grid for the dimensions in
the original five-factor CASS model for a US-airline.
The CASS subscales have been represented in the
Grid in Figure 5. This gives a more detailed
demonstration of the safety culture at the airline as it
reflects the variability of the subscales that indicate
the safety culture dimensions. It is clear that the
subscales reflect a safety culture that is Middle of the
Road with the exception of two subscales: Chief
Pilots and Instructors/Trainers.

Discussion
In the Middle of the Road safety culture the pilots get
mixed messages from the management: On the one
hand safety is consistently emphasized during
training but on the other hand instructors may teach
shortcuts and ways to get around safety requirements.
This supports that the safety culture is more Middle
of the Road than Collaborative with a tendency
towards Delegate-Safety-to-Others. This tendency is,
however, not statistically significant (p>0,05).
Possibly, because overall it is agreed that the safety
culture is positive but in need of improvement.

A comparative analysis of the airline studied in this
research (non-US airline) and an airline previously
studied by Wiegmann et al in 2003 (US-airline) using
the same metric revealed that there is a considerable
difference in safety cultures in those two
airlines/organizations. The non-US airline has a
culture that is characterized by a Middle-of-the-road
approximation with tendency towards DelegateSafety-to-Others. On the other hand the safety culture
grid for the US-airline demonstrates a culture that
values a Collaborative team environment but at the
same time the safety culture is tending clearly
towards administrative Master Plan. In this
comparison it should be kept in mind that the
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Wiegmann et al used the five-factor model but in the
present study the four- factor model was applied,
which presents a more thorough analysis of the
factors and an improvement over the original model.

subsequently performed in both US and non-US
cultures since this study was completed and
preliminary results indicate acceptable reliability.

Survey results indicate that the overall safety culture
at the study airline is generally positive on average
and above the neutral point on all dimensions, though
considerable variability exists in pilots’ safety culture
perceptions. All areas of the safety culture show
room for improvement. The safety culture at this
airline appears to be strongest in the areas of
operational personnel (e.g. chief pilots and
instructors) and weakest in the area of organizational
commitment (e.g. going beyond compliance).
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Particular weaknesses concern especially, with two
areas. Firstly, pilots perceive management as too
focused on making money than being safe and
secondly, that it applies merely the regulatory
minimums when it comes to issues of flight safety
and nothing more. Once the management of an
organization realizes that safety is financially
rewarding and that the costs incurred have to be seen
as investments with a positive return, the road to a
full safety culture is open. Pilots also note they would
like to be more actively involved in development and
improvement of procedures and safety concerns,
which they currently are not according to the survey
results. Good safety cultures are characterized by
good communication between management and the
rest of the company. This not only enhances safety,
but can elevate morale and in some cases,
productivity. Having a definitive focus for improving
communication can result in improved performance
at all levels. The feedback/comments from the
respondents can aid the management of the airline to
effectively allocate resources to the safety issues in
need of improvement.
The generalization of these findings is somewhat
limited due to low response rate. In this study, as well
as described by Wiegmann et al. (2003), only pilots
and supervisory personnel were asked to complete
the survey and therefore no conclusion can be
reached regarding the state of safety culture among
other groups of employees that are responsible for
safety at the airline. Until this is accomplished, we
have only partial information as to the overall safety
culture at the airline. In spite of this we can conclude
that the objectives of the research have been achieved
and an appropriate study of flight operations safety
culture at the airline has been conducted.
Furthermore, we can conclude that the CASS is
psychometrically appropriate to non-US operations.
Further development and testing of this tool has been
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